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BOOK REVIEWS
Price Formation in Natural Gas Fields:
A Study of Competition, Monopsony, and Regulation
By
PAUL W. MACAVOY
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962
pp. xix, 281, $6.75
The economic characteristics and behavior of the domestic petro.
leum industry have been the subject of numerous studies in the
postwar years by academic economists. Professor MacAvoy in this
volume analyzes one of the most controversial aspects of this industry-pricing of natural gas in the field and the economic reasons
for the regulation of field prices by the Federal Power Commission.
While the book deals primarily with the period 1950-1960, the
analysis and conclusions are applicable to the still unsolved problem
of gas producer regulation today.
The book logically divides into three parts. The first part' outlines the technical and institutional framework, describes the supply
and demand concepts in this particular industry, and discusses expected price and output behavior under several different theoretical
market structures-competition, monopoly, and monopsony (buyer
monopoly). The second part 2 is a painstaking statistical analysis of
actual market structures and price behavior during the 1950's in
the three major gas supply areas of the United States-West Texas
and New Mexico, the Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast, and the southern Mid-Continent area, and contains a comparison of what actually
occurred vis-a-vis market structures and prices with the theoretical
norms established earlier in the book. The third part 3 draws some
policy conclusions with respect to the desirability of regulation and
the economic effects of regulation, given the conclusions about market structures and market behavior in the three areas.
Gas producer regulation has been debated in the courts and Congress and before the Federal Power Commission for almost twenty
years, and much of this debate has centered on whether or not gas
1. Chs. 1-4.
2. Chs. 5-7.
3. Ch. 8.
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producers hold monopoly positions in the gas supply areas and thus
enjoy monopoly prices and monopoly profits. This book should
settle this question once and for all at least for the period up to
1960; seller monopoly has not existed to any significant degree in
the major gas supply areas. In fact, quite the reverse has been true.
Monopsony prevailed in all three areas to some degree and for
some years during the 1950's. It quite obviously existed in all areas
immediately after the war, but has broken down or is breaking
down in most areas because of the entry of new pipelines and the
expansion of old pipelines in each area. Competition is growing in
all areas.
To determine the type of market structure, Professor MacAvoy
sets up several criteria, all of which he justifies in his theoretical
discussion. He theorizes that higher prices will be paid1. For larger volumes of gas under competition than for small
volumes, while under monopsony the same prices will be paid no
matter what volumes are purchased;
2. For gas located nearer the "end" of transmission under competition, while under monopsony the same prices will be paid regardless of location;
3. For long-term contracts under competition, while under monopsony the term of contract will have no effect on price or might
possibly result in higher prices for long-term contracts;
4. In most instances if contracts do not have "favored nation"
or "renegotiation" clauses.
By taking data from actual contracts on file with the Federal Power
Commission between purchaser pipelines and producers, MacAvoy
finds that the conditions one would expect from monopsony held true
in West Texas-New Mexico until the late 1950's when a new purchaser entered the area. Similarly, monopsony prevailed in the Gulf
Coast area in the late 1940's and did not break down until the 1950's
when new lines were built and old lines were expanded. In the Panhandle-Hugoton area, monopsony was not as evident; however, in
the smaller Mid-Continent fields, far distant from the central supply area, monopsony prevailed even in the late 1950's.
With respect to regulation, the author concludes
. . . the Commission [Federal Power Commission] need not have
set prices in order to have prevented [seller] monopoly, given the predominant presence of competition or monopsony. .

.

. The problem
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to be solved by regulation seems not to have existed, so that the court
mandate was given for 'wrong' reasons. The necessity for Federal
4

Power Commission regulation is doubtful.

The conditions which might justify regulation absent monopoly are
those which create "economic rents" which accrue to producers because of unique location or other conditions. Regulation may be
justified to bring about a transfer of such "rents" from producers
to consumers. 'Given monopsony and regulation, the assumption is
that the lower than competitive prices under monopsony are passed
on to consumers so that monopsony profits do not result. Even if
regulation does accomplish this, and it may not, there remains the
more basic question of whether society benefits, in a net sense, from
such regulation. MacAvoy takes the position that it is likely that
the fixing of prices below this competitive equilibrium level not only
takes away producers' rents, but also causes a net social loss (in a
consumer surplus sense). Unconnected consumers lose more because of a supply shortage than connected consumers gain from the
lower than equilibrium price.
This volume was initiated as a doctoral dissertation and later expanded and revised into this work. It is written primarily to an
audience of economists who are comfortable with economic concepts and jargon. Others will find part of it, especially the theoretical parts, difficult reading. This is not to say the book is not readable. MacAvoy has put the theory into relatively simple geometry
and has relegated to footnotes and appendices the more complicated
mathematics. His regression analysis is skillfully done, and the
reader is apt to overlook in the summary tables the tremendous
data gathering and processing task involved. The book is short
and compact and perhaps would have had wider appeal if more of
the details of the industry had been explained to the economist and
more of the details of the theoretical concepts had been spelled out
for the non-economist. Subtle points seem at times to get lost in the
brevity.
The economist may chafe a bit at the strictly short-run analysis
with respect to market structure and behavior and the drawing of
policy conclusions which are more long term in character. In particular, the discussion of supply is almost entirely in terms of the
cost of developing already found reserves. The author, and per4. Pp. 252-53.
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haps wisely so, does not attempt to define the long-run supply curve
for gas, though the long-run supply may be the crucial policy consideration. The demand side also seems truncated. The intrastate
market is not included in the statistical analysis and is not given
much attention in the discussion. This market may have behaved
somewhat differently from the interstate market. Lack of data
probably explains this omission. The discussion of the demand curve
for gas stresses the "derived" nature of demand and the dependence
of demand in the field on demand by final consumers. It is at best
difficult to estimate empirically the demand curve for any commodity or service. To do so for a service whose retail price is a regulated monopoly price, and whose retail market involves legal price
discrimination among classes of customers, is even more difficult.
Demand becomes critical, since one argument for producer regulation has been that pipelines do not bargain for the lowest possible
field price, but rather take any price and pass it on to the retail
distributor. Fuller discussion of these aspects would have been
helpful.
The author has carefully distilled a mountain of meaningless raw
data which exists in the Federal Power Commission files and
brought forth an incisive volume which gives insight into gas producer regulatory problems that can be found nowhere else. It is
certainly essential reading for anyone who works in the area of
gas producer regulation, be he economist, lawyer or engineer. The
solution to the chaos of producer regulation has not been found in
part because there exist incorrect ideas of what the structure of the
industry looks like and how it behaves. This book should effectively
sweep aside several widely held misconceptions that hamper national policy making for natural gas, and hopefully it should point
out what regulatory paths will be most fruitful.
WALLACE

F. LOVEJoy*

* Professor of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

